Publications
Why Epistemic Partiality Is Overrated
2018 - in a special issue of Philosophical Topics (eds. Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder), co-authored with Nomy Arpaly
Review of Christensen and Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
2015 - Analysis, co-authored with Tomás Bogardus
2018 - in a special issue of Philosophical Topics (eds. Rima Basu and Mark Schroeder), co-authored with Nomy Arpaly
Review of Christensen and Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
2015 - Analysis, co-authored with Tomás Bogardus
Dissertation Overview
My dissertation is an exploration of the norms that govern belief. My first and fundamental goal is to look at what domains give rise to the norms that govern belief – just truth? friendship? morality? prudence? – in hopes of gaining insight into what these norms are. My secondary goal is to lend support to views that are broadly in the spirit of the traditional thought that truth alone gives rise to norms of belief.
In several recent debates about friendship, promising, and prejudice, various philosophers have advanced accounts according to which these domains give rise to norms on belief. Although they are separate debates, philosophers in one debate often cite accounts in the other debates in order to soften up their readers to the general idea that domains besides truth exert normative force on belief. It’s not uncommon to see a defender of moral norms on beliefs, for example, pointing to accounts which implicate norms of belief that stem from friendship or prudence.
In each chapter of the dissertation, I take on one of these domains with two objectives in mind: first, to suggest that the domain in question does not give rise to norms on belief and, second, to develop an alternative account that (better) fulfills the purpose for which the account implicating norms on belief was intended to fulfill. In chapter one, I take on friendship – I, first, argue against the doxastic account of the cognitive demands of friendship and, second, develop a new account that centers on attention instead of belief. In chapter two, I take on promising – I, first, argue against a solution to the so-called “promising puzzle” that involves practical norms on belief and, second, develop a solution that doesn’t involve such norms. In chapters three and four, I take on prejudice – I, first, argue that cases of belief that seem to be rational and prejudiced don’t compel us into accepting moral norms on belief and, second, develop an alternative approach to these cases that better accounts for their complicated moral structure.
In several recent debates about friendship, promising, and prejudice, various philosophers have advanced accounts according to which these domains give rise to norms on belief. Although they are separate debates, philosophers in one debate often cite accounts in the other debates in order to soften up their readers to the general idea that domains besides truth exert normative force on belief. It’s not uncommon to see a defender of moral norms on beliefs, for example, pointing to accounts which implicate norms of belief that stem from friendship or prudence.
In each chapter of the dissertation, I take on one of these domains with two objectives in mind: first, to suggest that the domain in question does not give rise to norms on belief and, second, to develop an alternative account that (better) fulfills the purpose for which the account implicating norms on belief was intended to fulfill. In chapter one, I take on friendship – I, first, argue against the doxastic account of the cognitive demands of friendship and, second, develop a new account that centers on attention instead of belief. In chapter two, I take on promising – I, first, argue against a solution to the so-called “promising puzzle” that involves practical norms on belief and, second, develop a solution that doesn’t involve such norms. In chapters three and four, I take on prejudice – I, first, argue that cases of belief that seem to be rational and prejudiced don’t compel us into accepting moral norms on belief and, second, develop an alternative approach to these cases that better accounts for their complicated moral structure.
